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█ Abstract Jennifer Radden argues that it is impossible to imagine sensuously pain and explains this by 
noting that pains are sensory qualities for which there is no distinction between appearance and reality. By 
contrast, I argue that only basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective are, with 
some qualifications, impossible. Non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain from the first person perspective 
are possible. I explain the extent to which imagining pain is impossible in terms of the conditions required 
for representing the painfulness of pain. I outline some difficulties with Radden’s favoured explanation 
and note how imagining pains may have a role in depression and, to that extent, keep open the option that 
it may have a partly delusional character. 
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█ Riassunto  Spiegare l’impossibilità e la possibilità di immaginare il dolore – Jennifer Radden sostiene come 
l’immaginazione sensoriale del dolore non sia possibile e lo motiva facendo notare come i dolori siano qua-
lità sensoriali per cui non c’è distinzione tra apparenza e realtà. Per converso io sostengo come sia impossi-
bile solo l’immaginazione sensibile di base del dolore dalla prospettiva della prima persona, con alcune spe-
cificazioni. L’immaginazione sensibile non di base del dolore dalla prospettiva della prima persona è possi-
bile. Illustro fino a che punto l’immaginare il dolore è impossibile in termini di condizioni richieste per 
rappresentare la dolorosità del dolore. Sottolineo alcune difficoltà della spiegazione proposta da Radden e 
faccio notare come l’immaginare il dolore può aver un ruolo nella depressione e come, per questo, resti 
aperta l’opzione che il dolore possa avere in parte carattere illusorio. 
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IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE to be invited to comment 
on Jennifer Radden’s searching and intriguing es-
say on depression and imagining pain. She is inter-
ested in the question of whether severe depression 
can contain a delusional element and, in particu-
lar, whether the delusional element might involve 
imagining pain of a physical or psychological vari-
ety (“delusional affection”). Imaginary pain can 
figure in the production of depression in at least 
two ways. The first, which is Radden’s principal 
target, is where the pain associated with severe 
depression is imaginary.1 The second is that one is 
depressed because of pains that, in fact, are imagi-
nary. Hypochondria would be a candidate exam-
ple.2 To illustrate the difference, if I am depressed 
because I imagine a persisting pain in my foot, 
then that is depression based upon imagination in 
the second sense. If my depression at my social in-
adequacy and sense of hopelessness is taken to be 
painful because I imagine that the depression is 
(emotionally) painful, then we have a case of the 
first kind.  
Although the first, psychological, type of case is 
her principal target, she works up to it, and spends 
most attention on, the second type of case. In addi-
tion, her strategy is to begin by focusing on the 
more specific case of bodily pain and then suggest-
ing that psychological pain shares with bodily pain 
certain key elements, including somatic features. I 
shall focus more on the bodily case because I want 
to question her explanation of the unimaginability 
of pain at the point of its initial development. Alt-
hough I will join her in discussing bodily pain and 
psychological pain together, there are good reasons 
to question this assimilation, and some of my 
points working within this shared assumption, and 
towards the formulation of a single impossibility 
thesis, may have to be separated if the assumption 
is dropped.3 At the end, I shall also consider ways in 
which malfunctioning or irrational imagination 
may support depression more generally.  
The imagination of pain involved in either case 
is of a particular sort. We can imagine other peo-
ple, and ourselves in pain, if we are imagining the 
subject of pain from the perspective of an observ-
er. That’s not the relevant kind of imagining pain. 
The relevant kind involves imagining that one is 
in pain as part of our first person perspective on 
our own mental lives, for example, as an element 
in imagination of my stream of consciousness. But 
even that is not specific enough. One type of imag-
ining is purely cognitive. I can imagine that I am 
in pain as part of a project of fooling you that I 
should be let off marking for the department. In 
such a case, I might only be supposing or enter-
taining the thought that I am in pain and clutch-
ing my side. This is not the relevant kind of first 
person imagining. The question is whether we can 
imagine being in pain now as part of our current 
experience of our own mental life in the same way, 
say, as I can imagine the front of my mum’s house 
to count the number of south facing windows. Call 
this the sensuous imagining of undergoing pain 
from the first person perspective. With one pre-
liminary qualification below, I agree with Radden 
that this kind of imagining of pain from the first 
person perspective does not seem to be something 
that we can imagine.4 Consider the possibilities of 
self-punishment if we could imagine pains in this 
way! This does not seem to be a phenomenon. 
In this discussion, I will do three things. First, I 
will set out the impossibility thesis about imagin-
ing pain with the further qualification to which I 
adverted. Second, I will criticise Radden’s fa-
voured explanation of it and outline my preferred 
approach. Third, I will discuss at the end the ways 
in which malfunctioning, irrational or non-
rational imaginings may still be involved in de-
pression in the spirit of trying to keep some theo-
retical options open.  
 
█  1 The impossibility thesis 
 
The impossibility thesis to be considered is that:  
 
It is not possible to imagine sensuously being in 
pain from the first person perspective. 
 
Suppose that the phenomenal properties of a 
mental state or event are those properties of a 
mental state or event that determine what they are 
like to be in or undergo. Corresponding to the var-
ious sensory modalities – vision, audition, olfac-
tion, and so on – and to bodily sensations more 
generally, there are, potentially, various modalities 
of sensuous imagining: visual sensuous imagin-
ings, auditory sensuous imaginings, and bodily 
sensation sensuous imaginings such as sensuously 
imagining a sensation of warmth. One plausible 
condition laying down the relationship between 
sensory modalities, bodily sensations, and their 
corresponding modalities of sensuous imagining is 
that they have a similar phenomenal character, 
where the phenomenal character is constituted by 
the phenomenal properties of their respective 
states or events. In which case, the impossibility 
claim may be understood as the claim that it is not 
possible to be in an imaginative state with a suffi-
ciently similar phenomenal character to pain. Talk 
of “sufficiently similar” is imprecise but a key ele-
ment of this is, obviously, that the sensuous imag-
ination of pain should hurt. The hurt does not 
have to be as great as that involved in pain. Visual-
ly imagining something green is not to experience 
the thing in question with exactly the same phe-
nomenal character as the corresponding sensory 
experience of green. As we might be tempted to 
say, the colour is not as vivid. Nevertheless, if I am 
to imagine sensuously pain from the first person 
perspective, there should be a phenomenally suffi-
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cient similarity between pain and the sensuous 
imagination of pain. That is what the thesis claims 
is not possible. 
As formulated, the thesis is neutral about the 
nature of the imaginative content. One might take 
it that what is imagined must be an object or 
property instance. However, if, as some philoso-
phers argue, the fundamental nature of perception 
should be characterised in terms of propositional 
contents, then the corresponding sensuous imag-
ining will be propositional too.5 This issue is inde-
pendent of the thesis considered here and thus it is 
better not to emphasise the non-propositional 
character of this form of imagining (as Radden 
does).6 Equally, the impossibility claim is neutral 
on the issue of whether imagining objects and 
properties in the world always involves imagining 
an experience of these objects and properties, alt-
hough some take the impossibility thesis to sup-
port a positive answer.7 
The impossibility thesis might seem to involve 
commitment to one issue however. According to 
some philosophers, hallucinations are imaginings. 
Specifically, they are internally triggered imagin-
ings impervious to the will.8 Pain in phantom 
limbs may count as hallucinations on the grounds 
that subjects experience of pain is not the result of 
nociceptive stimulation in the limb itself. If hallu-
cinations are imaginings, then imagined pains can 
hurt after all since nobody questions the pain that 
those with phantom limb pain experience.9 Hallu-
cinations of painfulness in the phantom limb are 
still genuine pain experiences. 
This is one reason why the impossibility claim 
should be understood as limited to active imagin-
ings rather than any that might be involved in hal-
lucination (as Radden seems to acknowledge).10 It 
is plausible that active imaginings of various forms 
are the only imaginings there are. Hallucinations 
are similar to imaginings in that they involve phe-
nomenally similar content but this should not be 
taken to imply it is legitimate to count them as 
imaginings too. But we can set this issue aside. 
The impossibility thesis requires further ad-
justment. Radden notes that there is a difference 
between imagining something with feeling and 
imagining having that feeling.11 One illustration is 
imagining learning a piece of terrible news like the 
death of a close friend. Even if the imagining 
makes us feel upset, the suggestion is we are not 
imagining being upset but the upset is a conse-
quence of our imagining. But this distinction does 
not cover all the cases.  
These are painful times. People have lost loved 
ones to COVID-19, parents have lost children to 
abduction and, subsequent, death. Part of what 
makes these events cause great suffering is what 
the people imagine about their loved ones’ last 
moments. Suppose that one of the individuals af-
fected by death or disappearance of a loved one 
feels numb. At the moment, what has happened 
does not sink in. In those circumstances, it would 
be possible for the individual to imagine the pain 
that they would feel if they were looking through 
the glass window into an intensive care isolation 
ward with the COVID-19 sufferer unable to ap-
preciate that they were there, dying alone, or the 
pain of seeing what happened to their child pow-
erless to help. The imaginings that, in most cir-
cumstances, would be described as a source of 
their suffering – imaging with feeling rather than 
imagining having that feeling – would be imagin-
ing the pain. Such an imaginative act would also, 
no doubt, generate the feeling as well. But it is le-
gitimate to describe it as imagining the pain. 
Radden might suggest that in these cases, we 
would be reliving and not imagining the pain on 
receiving the news.12 This can’t be right. The pain 
in question is one that we haven’t experienced be-
fore relating to what is imagined (because what we 
imagine is something new). So it can’t be assimi-
lated to case of flashbacks and memories.13 
Where the first type of case concerned emo-
tional pain, a second type of case can typically in-
volve clear cases of physical pain when we try to 
understand the behaviour of another person by 
simulating their pain, in roughly the same way we 
also might try to simulate their beliefs and de-
sires.14 It is plausible that recreative imagination is 
involved, prompted by what is happening to the 
person and how they are responding to it.15 When 
we seek to recreate imaginatively states with phe-
nomenal character, sensuous imagination is in-
volved and what we sensuously imagine is that we 
are in such and such a phenomenal state, in this 
case, our target state: pain. This has been investi-
gated by experimental settings in which pain stim-
uli were applied to a partner, pictures presented 
involving apparent damage to a hand, or facial ex-
pressions of pain. There is some evidence that, in 
these circumstances, the hurt is imagined (activa-
tion in anterior insula and anterior cingulate cor-
tex correlated with empathy scores and evalua-
tions of the significance of the pain,16 heightened 
response when a picture is supposed to be of one’s 
own hand,17 although in these areas there is not 
too much differentiation between fear and pain 
responses).18 In contrast to the previous type of 
case, there is a question mark over whether such 
cases involve active sensuous imaginings even if 
recreative imagining more generally has active el-
ements. This is partly underlined by the debate 
about whether the pain of another is seen or imag-
ined in response to what is seen.19 De Vignemont 
and Jacob suggest that it is subintentional imagin-
ings.20 I will return to this element later. 
The key point for now is that, in the cases just 
described, we are imagining the pain by focusing 
imagining on what causes, or would cause the 




basic action is an act of doing A without it being the 
case that there is something distinct from A that 
one aims to do in virtue of which one does A. The 
cases just described are plausibly described as non-
intentionally basic acts of imagining pain. We are 
doing something in virtue of which we will imagine 
the pain rather than imagining the pain straight. 
But this does not mean that we are simply imagin-
ing something else and feeling the pain. We aim to 
imagine being in pain by doing something else. 
What seems more obviously impossible is a 
basic act of sensuously imagining pain from the 
first person perspective. Thus the key formulation 
of the impossibility thesis is this: 
 
It is not possible for the following to be a inten-
tionally basic act of imagination: to imagine 
sensuously being in pain from the first person 
perspective. 
 
Non-basic sensuous imagination of something 
still counts as imagining in the relevant sense. I 
might imagine the front windows of my mum’s 
house by imagining the house. The windows come 
as part of that front. It needn’t be the case that I 
imagine, or should be able to imagine, the windows 
as an intentionally basic act of the imagination in 
order to be correctly attributed the state of sensu-
ously imagining the windows from the first person 
perspective. So we can allow, equivalently, that 
there are non-basic intentional sensuous imaginings 
of pain compatible with the impossibility thesis. 
People may vary about whether they need to imag-
ine something intentionally non-basically to form 
the required sensuous imagining. The issue is why, 
in the case of pain, there seems (with some qualifi-
cations we shall note later) no cases of intentionally 
basic acts of sensuously imagining pain (that is, 
with the required element of painfulness). 
 
█  2 Explanation of the impossibility thesis 
 
Radden draws upon two elements of Eva 
Brann’s position to explain the impossibility thesis 
but puts the emphasis on one of them.21 The first 
is that, if there is a distinction between sensory 
appearance and reality, then there is an internal 
sensory field in which sensory objects are situated 
upon which the mind’s inner eye is directed. This 
is Brann’s triadic structure of inner eye, internal 
field and sensible object.22 The second is that, in 
the absence of a distinction between sensory ap-
pearance and reality, a sense will only deliver im-
mediate qualities or feels.23 Brann takes this to be 
shown with respect to touch, smell and taste. Rad-
den extends this to pain.  
As Radden notes, “dimly recognised” body 
maps may provide a comparable internal field to 
the ones that Brann emphasises – visual and audi-
tory – to allow for a similar structure for bodily sen-
sations including pains.24 However, she concurs 
with Brann’s denial of the distinction between ap-
pearance and reality for bodily sensations. Bodily 
sensations, and pain in particular, involve immedi-
ate qualities or feels. If those are not present, then a 
subject is not in pain. If they are, then they are in 
pain and so, presumably, not merely imagining be-
ing in pain. Thus she concludes 
 
Phenomenal elements of each kind will be ex-
perienced or not, in the manner of raw feels – 
explaining why, trying to imagine them (P sim-
pliciter imagining), without re-experiencing 
them, we fail.25 
 
So the explanation comes to this. If there is no 
distinction between appearance and reality in the 
case of pain, then when we seek to imagine sensu-
ously pain from the first person perspective either 
we are in pain because the feels are present, and so 
pain is re-experienced not imagined, or there is 
nothing that is imagined.  
There are a number of problems with this ex-
planation. First, what we needed to explain re-
mains unexplained once we have reformulated the 
issue to take into account the two alternatives 
Radden takes there to be: re-experiencing or imag-
inative failure. Radden acknowledges that there 
are re-experiences of traumatic phenomena in the 
case of flashbacks. These aren’t perceptions but 
they are not imaginings either because the subject 
is a passive victim of such experiences rather than 
active in their production. There is a third option 
that we need to get out of the way. Subjects can 
suffer from obsessional-compulsive imagery such 
as one’s children burning, being smothered or 
stabbed in the chest, animal corpses, or bodies 
crushed or cut in half by a train for which there is 
no evidence they have previously experienced 
them.26 Obviously subsequent experiences of these 
images could be re-experiencings of the previous 
experience of them but there is no particular rea-
son for supposing that this is so as opposed to a 
distinct token experience of the same type occur-
ring. Taking these into account, by Radden’s 
lights, we have two options with regard to pain: 
experiencing it (which includes re-experiencing 
but also covers experiencing it for the first time in 
one’s imagery) or imaginative failure. 
This brings me to the first problem with Rad-
den’s explanation. Her explanation of our inability 
to imagine pain sensuously from the first person 
perspective is that, if we did so, it would not count 
as an imagining but rather as an experiencing of 
pain. So we wouldn’t have imagined pain but ra-
ther genuinely be in pain. However, this doesn’t 
explain what we needed to explain. To see this 
consider the issue within her framework. If active 
imaginings of pain are really, by her lights, active 
experiences of pain then we have an explanation 
Explaining impossible and possible imaginings of pain 
 
177
of why we can’t imagine pain but we don’t have an 
explanation of why we can’t actively experience 
pain. Why can’t I, by setting myself the task of im-
agining pain, produce in myself an experience that 
is genuinely painful? The fact that we might classi-
fy such a case as an experience rather than an im-
agining of pain, if Radden is right, is beside the 
point. We have no explanation of the key fact, 
namely setting out to imagine this thing is not a 
way of being in pain. The interest of the case of 
flashbacks and obsessional compulsive imagery is 
that they seem to highlight the significance of the 
active component of imagination in an explana-
tion of the impossibility thesis.  
Second, even if there is no distinction between 
a mental life involving an appearance of pain and 
one in which there is pain, it doesn’t follow that 
imagining that one is in pain sensuously from the 
first person perspective is exactly the same as be-
ing in pain. When we imagine any experience, this 
is not equivalent to the mind having the appear-
ance of being in the state in question. It is recog-
nised that imagination lacks features, say, that the 
corresponding perception possesses. Radden 
seems to have an idea of imagining pain sensuous-
ly from the first person perspective that is equiva-
lent to hallucination here but that is not what im-
agining pain involves. Consider another state in 
which there may be no difference between ap-
pearance and reality, namely imagining an experi-
ence of an object being phenomenally red. Phe-
nomenal redness is the particular way that a sub-
ject sees red objects which may differ between 
subjects (if spectrum inversion is a possibility). 
Phenomenal redness may be taken to be distinct 
from redness even in the absence of the possibility 
of spectrum inversion if the redness of an object is 
a disposition or surface reflectance property and 
phenomenal redness is used to characterise how 
red objects seem to subject if they don’t show up 
as dispositions or surface reflectance properties in 
experience. It is an open question whether our ex-
periences of red display redness as a surface reflec-
tance or dispositional property or not. The point 
I’m making is just that there can be theoretical 
reason to postulate a property of phenomenal red-
ness independently of the possibility of spectrum 
inversion. In any event, the key point is that I can 
imagine a visual experience of an object that is 
phenomenally red and yet not be in state in which 
I am visually experiencing an object that is phe-
nomenally red.  
Third, the suggestion that pain is not sensuous-
ly imaginable because it is an immediate quality or 
feel assimilates the inability to imagine sensuously 
pain from the first person perspective to the ina-
bility to have olfactory, gustatory and other bodily 
sensation imagery. However, there is evidence 
that these other forms of imagery are possible. For 
example, although there are individual differences 
over whether or not subjects can imagine smells, 
there is evidence that some certainly can.27 For ex-
ample, vivid olfactory imagers can change the 
amount of saliva produced depending upon the 
food flavour imagined (olfaction being part of our 
experience of flavour).28 Equally, appeal to olfacto-
ry imagination can assist the detection of flavours 
in a comparable way to olfactory perception (e.g. 
imagining strawberry, detecting sucrose) and 
hamper the detection of flavours when in conflict 
(e.g. imagining ham, detecting sucrose) suggesting 
the presence of olfactory imagery.29 This is not 
present when subjects have non-olfactory imagery 
of the same thing.30 These suggest that sensuous 
olfactory imagination from the first person per-
spective is possible and, thus, whatever subjective 
features such experiences have cannot be the ex-
planation of the impossibility claim.31 
Fourth, and finally, her explanation does not 
respect the difference between basic and non-basic 
sensuous imagining of pain. If her explanation 
were correct, then both would be impossible be-
cause even non-basic imaginings of pain would fall 
in the category of experiencing pain. However, we 
have seen that there are plausible non-basic sensu-
ous imaginings of pain. We need an explanation 
that is sensitive to this difference. 
A better explanation of the impossibility thesis 
is to focus on the conditions for the representation 
of pain. One dimension of pain is plausibly just the 
representation of a sensory quality at the apparent 
location of the pain (let “PQ” stand for pain senso-
ry qualities), where the pain has a location. PQ will 
relate to the way in which the body is affected by 
the typical cause of the pain. However, an im-
portant second part of pain is the painfulness. 
Something painful is represented to be at a certain 
location in our body (say). My suggestion is that 
this second element of the representation of pain 
is represented by a disposition to respond aver-
sively to the location in question’s apparent pos-
session of PQ.32 I say “apparent possession of PQ” 
to cover the case of referred pain. 
The painfulness of pain is plausibly a response 
dependent property. Although there is something 
that is painful and, indeed, has properties which, if 
it did not have, it would not be painful, the posses-
sion of the property of painfulness depends upon, 
in part, the responses of a subject. There is a prima 
facie charge of circularity that such an approach 
needs to answer. Response dependent properties 
are usually given the following characterisation  
 
(RDP) O is R = O has the disposition to produce 
M(R) in subjects of type S, in C.33 
 
Here R is a response dependent property and 
M(R) is the mental response characteristic of O’s 
possession of R. If M(R) is characterised, in turn, 




of O being R, (RDP) has not provided an informa-
tive characterisation of the response dependent 
property. So M(R) must be given an independent 
characterisation. My suggestion is that, in the case 
of painfulness, this characterisation is given in 
terms of a disposition of the subject, in whose 
body O is a part, to respond aversively to apparent 
properties of O (e.g. the way it is being damaged). 
Obviously, this is schematic but it can provide the 
basis for a discussion of the explanation I propose. 
Let M(Rp) be the disposition to respond aver-
sively to properties of O distinctive of painfulness. 
A subject’s experience represents the painfulness 
of pain when the experience includes, as a part of 
its representational properties, M(Rp). M(Rp) is an 
intrinsically representational property of painful-
ness because it represents the response dependent 
property of painfulness (Rp) characterised in terms 
of the instantiation of M(Rp).34 The painfulness of 
pain has been thought to be an objection to repre-
sentationalist accounts of pain because it was as-
sumed that even, if our pain experiences repre-
sented damage to the body, or indeed, that there 
was something painful going on, this would not 
imply that the experience itself was unpleasant.35 
Recognition that the disposition to respond aver-
sively can itself be a representational property 
avoids this problem. 
This second element, the representation of the 
disposition by M(Rp) is present when we experience 
pain but there is no reason to expect it to be present 
when we attempt to imagine pain. For a number of 
different reasons, a basic intentional act of imagin-
ing pain removes the aversive response to PQ at its 
experienced location in all but special circumstanc-
es and so, whatever we imagine, when we attempt 
to imagine pain, cannot be experienced as an imag-
ination of something painful.  
First, we are familiar with the fact that if we are 
causes of pain in ourselves – for example, by rip-
ping a bandage off or trying to dig out a splinter – 
this hurts less than if somebody does it to us. The 
control involves us in suppressing the disposition 
to respond. Of course, we may not be able to bring 
ourselves to do the thing or do it badly in a way 
that makes things more painful. The relevant 
comparison is if we manage to do the same thing 
that otherwise would be done by somebody else. 
The control over our imagination of pain is much 
greater. As a consequence, the painful aspect is 
even more suppressed than when we are simply 
causing pain in ourselves by what we do. A com-
parison that might help here is with tickling one-
self. It is difficult precisely because of the predict-
ability of the tickle as a result of our control. 
Second, part of the disposition to respond 
aversively to pain is anxiety over what is going on 
with one’s body. The anxiety is reduced by the fact 
that we are aware of ourselves imagining PQ as op-
posed to something happening to our body. In-
deed, if a representation of sensory qualities is pre-
sented to be real if they are unorganised by the 
subject in the context of the subject’s appreciation 
of their own agency, then the apparent unreality of 
what is imagined will add to the absence of any 
anxiety or aversive response.36 
What I have said earlier about the way in 
which we can imagine pain provides support for 
this position. In the non-basic cases of imagining 
pain, we imagine the conditions under which pain 
would arise. The imagination of the painfulness 
itself is not a basic act of imagination but a more 
or less uncontrolled consequence of what we are 
basically sensuously imagining. In addition, our 
basic sensuous imaginings of the situations are 
aimed at trying to characterise the way things are 
rather than imaginatively created in a way that 
might make them seem unreal. 
The proposal has one intriguing confirmation 
and prediction. Those suffering from pain asym-
bolia aren’t disposed to have an aversive response 
to pain and don’t experience the pain as painful. A 
natural way of thinking about the connection is to 
say that they don’t have the disposition because they 
don’t experience the pain as painful. However, my 
proposal is that their failure to have the disposition 
is the explanation of why they don’t experience the 
pain as painful. Although this reverses the intuitive 
ordering, in another way, the proposal receives 
some confirmation from the fact that such subjects 
experience something as pain but aren’t disposed to 
have an aversive response to it.  
If we took the natural order of explanation, 
then we would have the following puzzle. How 
could a subject experience something as pain and 
yet fail to take it as painful (and thus be disposed 
to have an aversive response to it). The quality 
would be the putative explanation of the disposi-
tion and yet it isn’t present. Whereas if the dispo-
sition to respond aversively is tied to the experi-
ence of the quality as painful, no further explana-
tion is required.37 The prediction is this. Those 
suffering from pain asymbolia would take pain to 
be no less basically imaginable than other bodily 
sensations. The impossibility thesis concerns that 
element of pain that they do not have. 
Both Radden and my own approach seek to 
appeal to the way in which the content of imagina-
tion must be determined to explain why pain can’t 
be imagined sensuously from the first person per-
spective. The advantages of my own approach are 
that it doesn’t rely upon strong and dubious theses 
about our experience of sensory qualities, it can 
respect the distinction between basic and non-
basic sensuous imagining for the imagining of pain 
and specifically explains why we find it hard basi-
cally to intend to produce an experience of some-
thing that hurts by attempting to imagine pain. 
The approach also has other advantages. It leaves 
open a wider theoretical space for the understand-
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ing of depression and can capture possible qualifi-
cations to the claim basic sensuous imagining of 
pain is not possible. I will outline these in the final 
section of the paper. 
 
█  3 Depression, malfunctioning imagination and 
the support of a disposition 
 
Radden argues that depression cannot be delu-
sional in, at least, two respects: subjects’ depressed 
feelings of pain cannot be imaginary and they 
cannot be responding to imaginary pains.38 In-
stead, if their depression partly involves painful 
feelings or is taken to be a response to bodily pain, 
then these must be genuine. On the assumption 
that the depressed aren’t deeply deluded and claim 
to feel pain when there is no experience of any 
kind to back this up, they are not deluded with re-
gard to their experiences because there can’t be 
imaginary experiences of pain.  
One qualification to this picture is the point I 
made about non-basic sensuous imaginings of pain 
from the first person perspective. These can pro-
vide an imaginary basis for some depression. To the 
extent that somebody is depressed because of their 
non-basic sensuous imaginings of pains, then there 
is the possibility of a delusory formation of the be-
liefs, and cognitive states more generally, that re-
flect the depressed person’s imaginative projects. If 
these projects are directed to negative outcomes as 
a result of anxieties and fears, then the non-basic 
sensuous imaginings of pain that they engender will 
be part of why such subjects complain that they are 
in pain when they may not be. 
There are further ways in which imagination 
may be involved in depression that may bring in 
elements of delusion. One way of understanding 
this is by focusing upon the function of sensuous 
imaginings. Unlike the case of belief and desires, it 
is questionable whether sensuous imaginings have 
a function in general in the same way that it is 
questionable whether entertaining thoughts have 
a function in general. Nevertheless, there are cer-
tain particular types of sensuous imaginings that it 
is legitimate to attribute a function. Recreative 
imaginings seek to reproduce the mental states of 
a distinct subject in order to predict their behav-
iour. Sensuous imaginings concerning particular 
possible outcomes as a result of hypothesised action 
have the function of enabling a subject to predict 
the outcome of their actions in order to satisfy their 
desires. Those who emphasise continuities between 
sensuous imaginings of this type and memories, 
may take the function of these states to be mental 
time travel in either direction: the way the future 
will be or the way the past was.39 
Consider sensuous imaginings that fail to per-
form either of the functions indicated but have 
harmful consequences in terms of the pains non-
basically imagined, anxieties provoked, pessimistic 
attitudes reinforced, and so on. It is plausible that 
depression could be supported by such sensuous 
imaginings. You don’t have to be committed to 
the view that any mental illness must involve a 
mental capacity malfunctioning – or in the envis-
aged case, failing to perform one of the functions 
which may have conferred evolutionary advantage 
upon a creature with that capacity – in order to 
think that this would be one important way in 
which depression may have an imaginary under-
pinning that makes it partly delusional.40 
This may be supplemented by a second way in 
which sensuous imagining may support depression 
that is rather more closely tied to the previous dis-
cussion. Sensuous imaginings are mental activities 
which, as a result, may sometimes occur as a result 
of weakness of will or involuntarily. When a sub-
ject imagines things in virtue of which they non-
basically sensuously imagine pain, this may be 
against their better judgment because their other 
motivational states speak against the merit of such 
imaginings, for example, as likely to involve dis-
tress. This would be a plausible case of imagining 
involving weakness of will. Equally sensuous imag-
inings may occur roughly in the way that breath-
ing does. I can stop my breath, or indeed breathe 
as a result of an intention to breathe now, but my 
breathing may be something I do involuntarily in 
the sense that I don’t stop it happening. Similarly 
sensuous imaginings may be actions while coming 
unbidden, that is, not the result of a particular in-
tention to have such and such a sensuous imagin-
ing or with a sense of mental exertion (or mental 
actish phenomenal quality).41 There is a weaker 
sense of involuntary action where it is simply a re-
flex action (a neurophysiological regularity involv-
ing a non-psychological stimulus and bodily re-
sponse).42 My talk of involuntary actions relating 
to sensuous imaginings involves something more, 
partly because the stimulus may be psychological 
(although falling short of what is required for vol-
untary action) and partly because, even more than 
in the case of breathing, it is possible to stop such 
imaginings. The fact that it is possible and yet that 
one does not in the circumstances envisaged is the 
key feature.  
These two possibilities suggest ways in which, 
if my explanation of the impossibility thesis is cor-
rect, depressed subjects may imagine something 
with more of the painful character than those who 
aren’t depressed and may have basic sensuous im-
aginings of pain. 
First, if a subject’s background motivational 
state is more supportive of the presence of the dis-
position to respond aversively, then basically im-
agining the sensory quality connected to pain may 
have this additional element. One example would 
be a subject who is in a state of heightened state of 
anxiety with regard to threats to their body. They 




potentially threatening to them although, given 
that they are depressed, may feel powerless to do 
anything about it.43 Any such sensations are imag-
ined to be pains because the disposition to re-
spond aversively is not undermined. 
To illustrate the point, let’s consider something 
with which many of us may be familiar which 
doesn’t involve depression. Consider the child who 
is very fearful of their hair being brushed, thinking 
that the brush will tug and cause them pain. They 
often protest that they are in pain even when we 
know that they could not be. We tell them we ha-
ven’t even started brushing their hair yet and yet 
they say that the tugging is hurting. We might add 
“Stop imagining the pain. You’re getting yourself 
worked up”. Yet, they can’t help themselves. They 
accept it would be better if they didn’t imagine 
what would happen if they had their hair brushed, 
but they do anyway. This is a case of weak-willed 
imagining. In these circumstances, their imagina-
tion of what will happen if their hair is brushed will 
be accompanied by the aversive disposition and, 
thus, will be genuinely painful. Children learn to 
control their imaginings and how they respond to 
them. Thus, incidences of weak willed imagining of 
this type occur less as they get older. Nevertheless, 
this experience of the behaviour of children indi-
cates a way in which we can be prone to basic sen-
suous imagining with a painful element. 
Let me turn to the second type of case, that in-
volving involuntary imaginings. I argued that the 
reason why we find it difficult basically to imagine 
sensuously pains from the first person perspective 
is that the disposition to respond aversively is un-
dermined by our control over our own imaginings. 
Involuntary imaginings lack this element. We may 
have control in so far as we can intervene to stop 
them but, in the absence of our intervention, they 
are something that we find ourselves doing. There 
may also be motivational support of the sort I 
have already identified but the absence of control 
itself makes the disposition to respond aversively 
more likely to be present. 
This second type of case doesn’t fit easily into the 
distinction I previously drew between basic and non-
basic imaginings since they are not taken to be the 
result of an intention. Nevertheless, they may still be 
appropriate to be characterised purposively and, by 
the nature of the case, there is nothing to rule out 
some of these imaginings being basic purposeful im-
aginings of pain (rather than imaginings that are 
purposeful imaginings of something else in virtue of 
which they are imaginings of pain). 
As well as feeling negative about their body, 
those with depression often complain about aches 
and pains in their body.44 This is some evidence of 
their successful sensuous imagining of pain from a 
first person perspective both in the basic case and 
the non-basic case. If depression resulted in cer-
tain kinds of pain related imaginings, then these 
imaginings may well be supported by the disposi-
tions to aversive responses that makes them imag-
inings of hurts. 
Let me close by remarking on a way in which 
depression may be supported not by imagination 
but by a failure of imagination. I have argued that 
the perception of expressive properties – both in 
works of art and also in the human face and body 
– involve imagining sensuously how an emotion 
may result in the properties of the entity that pos-
sesses the expressive properties.45 This act of sen-
suous imagining need not involve the emotion it-
self but the simulation of the emotion in sensuous 
imagination. It can be relatively automatic but 
nevertheless it involves the engagement of the 
subject. One way of noticing this is that it is possi-
ble to hear a piece of music without its expressive 
properties – although still with the all the notes 
etc. – if one deliberately seeks to suppress the im-
aginative engagement required.  
It has been noted that depressed subjects can see 
the other people as inanimate, like shop dummies.46 
This suggests that depressed subjects find it diffi-
cult to engage in the imaginative acts that enable 
them to see expressive properties instantiated in 
others. A consequence of this is that they will feel 
estranged from other people and find it difficult to 
trust them (these features are noted by Ratcliffe).47 
Would you trust somebody in whom you can see no 
emotional engagement, no recognition of you, no 
foundation for intimacy between you? 
 
█  4 Concluding remarks 
 
I have argued that, apart from the conditions 
mentioned below, basic sensuous imaginings of 
pain from the first person perspective are impos-
sible because of the conditions required for repre-
senting the painfulness of pain. Nevertheless, im-
agining pain may have a role in depression. First, 
non-basic sensory imaginings of pain may give rise 
to delusory beliefs about one’s condition. Second, 
weak willed imagining, supported by background 
motivation states may facilitate basic sensuous 
imaginings of pain. Third, involuntary imaginings 
of pain may also support depression. Depressed 
subjects may be responding to imaginings they 
find hard to resist as if they are perceptual experi-
ences giving them information about the way they 
are and their place in the world. Because this re-
sponse may not be a rational response to imagina-
tive experience, there remains the possibility of 
epistemic irrationality. However, it is also possible 
that the fault should primarily lie with the circum-
stances that lead up to the imaginative tendencies 
and capacities I identified. In that case, the re-
sponse would not be epistemically irrational but 
rather the malfunctioning of the imagination, or 
the susceptibility that gives rise to the successful 
imagining of pain, is part of the story of why a 
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subject is depressed. 
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